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ABSTRACT
Two highway bridge approaches, about 10 and 12 m in height, near Calcutta, India constructed with mechanically stabilized earth
failed recently. These embankments were founded on soft and compressible, fine-grained soils of the intertidal flats and backswamps
of the Ganges delta. One of these embankments, which failed in the final stages of its construction, was constructed after foundation
soils were strengthened with preloading and prefabricated vertical drain installation and the other second embankment that failed
within a month of its opening for traffic was constructed on unimproved ground. Fortunately, direct collateral damage from these
incidents was small. Available geotechnical data indicated that design inadequacy was the main cause of these failures. Using preand post- consolidation shear strengths the embankments were redesigned. Reconstruction involved PVD installation at the second
site and construction of stabilizing berms at both locations. The facilities are now operational and appear to be performing
satisfactorily. Details of the failures, post failure investigations and monitoring, and redesign are presented in the paper.

INTRODUCTION
Two highway embankments constructed with mechanically
stabilized earth failed recently near Kolkata (Calcutta) of
southern part of West Bengal state, India (Fig. 1). The sites
are located within the intertidal flats and backswamps of the
Hooghly, a major distributary of the Ganges (Fig. 2). One of
these sites, KM 18 site, remain waterlogged throughout the
year, and the other, KM 26 site, also remains waterlogged over
prolonged periods. Both the embankments were retained by
mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) walls constructed with
compacted river sand reinforced with galvanized steel
reinforcements.
Essential details of the incidents are presented first followed
by outlines of the subsurface investigation and monitoring
programs, the inference from these programs, redesign of the
earth structures, remedial measures incorporated and
subsequent reconstruction work are presented later.

Fig.1. Failures at KM 26 and KM 18site.
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Fig. 2. Geological and geomorphological setting.
INCIDENTS

KM 18 Failure

KM 26 Failure

The second incident involved an MSE wall that runs along the
western edge of the northbound lanes of a highway
approaching a railway overpass. A 30-year old, 9-m high
earth embankment with 3H to 1V side-slope along the eastern
edge of the approach carries the southbound traffic. The
failure occurred immediately after midnight on February 9,
2006 about a month after the highway was opened for
vehicular traffic. During the failure, a section of the newly
constructed 2-lane approach vertically settled by about 3 m
and laterally translated outward by about 1 m. The cross
section of the failed MSE wall is shown on Fig. 4. As at KM
26 site, the MSE wall at KM 18 site appeared to have failed
due to external instability without significant internal distress.

The first event affected a highway interchange structure, under
construction since July 15, 2003. The structure is retained by
a Mechanically Stabilized Earth wall along the outer shoulder
and with the fill slope of 2 (H):1(V) along the inner shoulder.
The nearly-complete MSE wall underwent a deep seated
failure in the early hours of rains received and an additional
0.4 mm of rainfall on the following day. The height of the
affected embankment was between 8.9 and 9.8 m at the time
of the incident. The cross section of the failed MSE wall is
shown on Fig. 3. Post failure inspection indicated that the
MSE wall failed due to external instability without significant
internal distress.

Fig. 3. Cross section and layout: KM 26 MSE wall.
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Fig. 4. Cross section of the KM 18 MSE wall.
The failed MSE wall was constructed for four laning of a
pre-existing two-lane, undivided highway that runs on the
30-year old embankment with 3(H):1(V) side slopes. The
construction of the old embankment also triggered several
slope failures. One such failure occurred in 1966, when the
embankment reached its full height 10.7 m. The instability
was assessed to be due to a deep-seated circular slip that day
lighted just beyond the toe. During this failure, the maximum
embankment height within the stable stretch was 6.7 m. As
remedial measures, the failed embankment was removed, the
highway elevation was lowered and the embankment was
reconstructed along with a 2.1-m high stabilizing berm along
the edges of the embankment. Another slope failure occurred
later immediately to the south of the railway tracks. Since
poor subsurface conditions did not allow construction of an
embankment of required height at the location of this failure,
the earth embankment at the location of this failure was
replaced by structural spans added to the bridge structure for
carrying the overpass. Details on the original geotechnical
investigation and design of the highway in this area can be
found in Gangopadhyay and Das (1969).
Incidentally, in the recent constructions for four laning project,
the north approach to the railway overpass at KM 18 site was
of similar details as those of the failed MSE wall. The
subsurface conditions at the north approach site and the
location of KM 18 failure were also comparable. However,
unlike the failed MSE wall, the north approach was
constructed on ground improved by PVD installation followed
by preloading and the MSE wall along the north approach has
remained stable since its construction.
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SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATION AND MONITERING
KM 26 Site
Pre failure subsurface investigation basically consisted of
drilling of six boreholes for foundation design for the overpass
structure and other boreholes were drilled in the post-failure
investigation. The field work in these investigations included
conducting standard penetration tests (SPTs), extraction of
thin-tube samples, and field vane shear testing (VST). The
laboratory tests included unconsolidated undrained (UU)
triaxial and one dimensional incrementally loaded
consolidation tests on selected thin tube samples, and tests for
grain size distribution, natural moisture content, liquid limit
and plastic limit.
Subsurface investigations at KM 26 indicate that the site is
underlain by 15-m thick, grey, silty clay of Holocene age over
stiff, yellow-brown, stiff silty clay of Pleistocene age
containing calcareous nodules and silt and sand interbeds.
The top 10 m of the Holocene soil was soft and contained
organics, and the lower 5 m of this unit was firm.
Groundwater was within 1.0 to 1.5 m of the original ground
surface at the time of post-failure investigation. The soil
samples were classified as CL according to ASTM D2487
(ASTM 2007). The undrained shear strength, su , of KM 26
site soils from UU tests and VSTs are plotted in Fig. 5a
against the effective vertical stress, σ v′ . All raw undrained
shear strengths from VST measurements were corrected in this
study according to Bjerrum (1974).
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Fig. 5. Undrained shear strengths.
One dimensional consolidation test data from KM 26 site
indicated that at the time of failure the consolidation process
under the stresses imposed by 6.7 m high embankment was
complete. This result was used for preparing Fig. 5a. The
sensitivity of the soil layers were between 4 and 7.
The embankment and the MSE wall at KM 26 site were
constructed after installing PVDs to depths between 11.5 and
15.5 m in square grids with 1.5 m spacing. The PVD treated
zone covered the entire embankment footprint and extended to
4 m outside of the MSE wall face. To monitor the settlements
and pore water pressure development during fill placement,
four settlement plates S1, S2, S3 and S4 and four stand pipe
piezometers P1, P2, P3 and P4 were installed near Station 800
(Fig. 3). These monitoring data indicate that the rapid
construction rate after October 31, 2004 lead to a rapid pore
water pressure development and accelerated settlement rate
(Fig. 6).
KM 18 Site
The available geotechnical data at the design stage originated
from two boreholes and all other boreholes were drilled after
the failure. The field work in these investigations included
conducting standard penetration tests (SPTs), extraction of
thin-tube samples, and field vane shear testing (VST). The
laboratory tests included unconsolidated undrained (UU)
consolidation tests of selected thin tube samples, and tests for
grain size distribution, natural moisture content, liquid limit
and plastic limit.
Data from these investigations indicate that the site is
underlain by a sequence of Holocene silty clay, over stiff silty
clay of Pleistocene age. The upper 5 to 8 m of the Holocene
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Fig. 6. KM 26 site monitoring data.
unit was firm and over-consolidated with pre-consolidation
pressures of up to 200 kPa underlain by a 3 to 5-m thick soft,
compressible, normally to lightly over-consolidated layer
containing organics and peat inclusions. The deepest part of
the Holocene soil was firm and normally consolidated. The
Pleistocene unit classified as silty clay with sand or sandy silt
partings
was
stiff
and
over-consolidated
with
pre-consolidation pressures of up to 300 kPa. Groundwater
was within 1.0 to 1.5 m of the original ground surface at the
time of post-failure investigation. The soil samples classified
as CL according to ASTM D2487 (ASTM 2006). The values
of su for KM 18 site soils from UU tests and VSTs are
plotted in Fig. 5b. For plotting these data it was assumed that
the deposits were completely consolidated under the stresses
due to the old embankment, and that the degree of
consolidation due to the newly constructed MSE wall that
failed, the embankment behind the MSE walls and the
stabilizing berm was 50 % over the top 2.5 m thickness of the
native foundation soils. The consolidation of the deeper
native soil layers because of the new embankment was
neglected. The sensitivity of the soil layers were between 4
and 7.
The site was only instrumented before MSE wall
reconstruction. Earlier there was no instrumentation at KM 18
site. However, a brief chronology of initial construction is as
follows. Since the site is permanently waterlogged, a 1-m
high earth embankment was constructed in mid January 2004
about 1-m to the west of the MSE wall alignment for
dewatering the area for construction. Dewatering began in
late January 2004, after which the site was stripped to a depth
of about 500 mm. A 500-mm thick compacted sand pad was
placed on the stripped surface. Where the base of the MSE
wall was to be at an elevation lower than the original ground
4

level, the original ground surface was excavated for
accommodating a 500-mm thick compacted sand pad
underneath the base of the MSE wall.
Sand filling
commenced in early February 2004 and MSE wall
construction began by the end of February 2004. The MSE
wall and the reinforced sand embankment behind it were about
8 m high by mid June 2004 and 9.25 m by early February
2005. There was virtually no earthwork between mid June
2004 and mid January 2005. Earthwork began in end
November 2005 and the embankment construction was
complete in early December 2005. The paving work was
completed by mid January 2006 and the stretch was opened
for vehicular traffic by mid January 2006.
Data from the instruments installed after failure for monitoring
the reconstruction activities, presented in Figure 7, indicate
that the settlements were continuing to develop and pore water
pressures were still dissipating after about 4.5 months of
preload placement (completed in the first week of January
2007) and PVD installation (completed in the third week of
October 2006).

Fig. 7. KM 18 site monitoring data.

KM 26 Embankment
As indicated earlier, construction at KM 26 site began after
installation of PVDs (Colbonddrain® CX1000) to 15 m depths
on an average in square grid pattern at 1.5 m centers. A
mandrel of diamond-shaped cross section with diagonals
nominally measuring 50 mm and 120 mm was used in PVD
installation.
Measurements from KM 26 site indicate that the undrained
shear strength at this location can be expressed as a function of
effective vertical stress shown with a solid line in Fig. 5a.
Since, the undrained shear strength is a function of effective
stress under which the deposit was in equilibrium, for
estimating the shear strength at the time of failure the state of
consolidation at that time needs to be assessed.
At KM 26 site, the average degree of consolidation was
obtained using
cvh = 0.02 m 2 day ( cvh : coefficient of
consolidation for flow in the horizontal direction) and
k h = 1 × 10 −10 m sec ( k h : horizontal hydraulic conductivity).
These estimates are from the one dimensional consolidation
tests performed in the laboratory and the assumptions that the
ratio of vertical to horizontal coefficients of consolidation of 2
and smear zone diameter to be 2.5 times the equivalent
mandrel diameter applicable for massive deposits (Hansbo
2004). The results indicate that the average degree of
consolidation for the foundation soils at the time of failure for
the vertical pressure for embankment height of 3.5 m was
100 % and that for the stage above 3.5 m that was constructed
relatively rapidly between October 31, 2004 and the time of
failure was about 50 %.
For the profile of peak undrained shear strength indicated with
the solid line on Fig. 5a, the results of limit equilibrium
stability computations for the MSE wall configuration at
failure indicate that the structure was marginally stable at the
time of failure according to the Generalized Limit Equilibrium
(GLE) procedure (Chugh 1986) (Fig. 8). Software package
XSTABL Version 5.1 (Interactive Software Designs, Inc.
1994) was used in all stability analysis of this study.

INITIAL EXTERNAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT
The failure patterns at KM 26 and KM 18 sites are indicative
of deep seated failure due to external instability of foundation
soils. Consequently, internal designs of the MSE walls are not
examined in this paper. Design of the embankments was to be
according to the Indian Roads Congress (IRC) document IRC:
75 (IRC 1979). This document calls for a limit equilibrium
factor of safety against external failure of 1.25 and an
allowable settlement of up to 600 mm. Brief accounts on limit
equilibrium stability analysis of KM 26 and KM 18
embankments are provided in the following subsections.
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Fig. 8. Undrained stability of KM 26 embankment at failure.
In comparison, the minimum factor of safety against circular
slip in the original design was under static loads was 1.15 in
the slope stability analysis. However, in the original design
the maximum considered embankment height including
pavement structure was 9 m against the actual maximum
height of 9.8 m and a total unit weight of 15 kN/m3 (in stead
of 18 to 19 kN/m3 representative of the compacted river sand
used to construct the embankment) was assumed for the
5

embankment body because of the initial plan of constructing
the embankment partly with fly ash. Most importantly, the
strength parameters used in the original design, shown on Fig.
5a for comparison, were based on the assumption that when
the embankment construction reached a height of 9 m, the
average degree of consolidation for the soil layers underneath
would be 90 % under the surcharge imposed by an
embankment of 7.1 m height resulting in an undrained shear
strength of 50 kPa minimum. Such a degree of consolidation
was not achieved because of rapid construction rate.
Moreover, even if 90% consolidation was to be achieved,
available test data from the site indicate that the undrained
shear strength would only have increased to about 30 kPa, an
estimate smaller than the value assumed in the original design.
Thus the bases of the original design were, in general,
unconservative. Even with these inputs, the overall stability
requirement of IRC (1979) of a limit equilibrium factor of
safety of 1.25 was not fulfilled.

In comparison, the minimum factor of safety against circular
slip in the original design was under static loading was 1.42 in
the slope stability assessment. However, in the original design
the maximum considered embankment height including
pavement structure was 8.4 m against the actual maximum
height of 10.5 m and a total unit weight of 15 kN/m3 was
assumed for the embankment body because of the initial plan
of constructing the embankment partly with fly ash. Most
importantly, the undrained shear strengths used in the original
design, shown on Figure 5b for comparison, were over a large
portion of the depth range of interest greater than those
inferred from laboratory and in-situ test data. Thus the bases
of the original design were, in general, unconservative.

KM 18 Embankment

The main factor contributing to the failures at KM 26 and KM
18 sites appears to be the difficulty of estimating the post
consolidation undrained shear strength of the soft foundation
soils. Examination of s u σ v′ − OCR data from KM26 and KM
18 sites were found to be in reasonable agreement with the
SHANSEP framework (Ladd et al., 1977) and relationship
between s u σ v′ and OCR could be approximated by

Data from KM 18 site indicate that (a) the undrained shear
strengths at this location decreases westward and (b) the
undrained shear strengths can be expressed as functions of
effective vertical stress as shown with a solid and a dashed
line on Fig. 5b.
External undrained stability of the configuration of the MSE
wall assessed using the simplified Bishop method (Bishop
1955). The input parameters used in the analysis were based
on the assumptions that (a) the soil layers underneath the MSE
wall were fully consolidated under the vertical stress imposed
by the old embankment, (b) that the degree of consolidation
due to the MSE wall and the newly constructed embankment
was 50 %, and (c) the undrained shear strength profiles can be
approximated with the solid and dashed lines of Fig. 5b. The
strength parameters for the old embankment were back figured
from stability analysis to match the observed instance of deep
seated rotational failure during the construction of the
embankment in the sixties described earlier. In the stability
assessment of the old embankment, strength parameters for
foundation soil were assumed in accordance with the dashed
line of Fig. 5b. The results of external stability assessment for
the MSE wall at failure indicate that the MSE wall and the
embankment behind it were indeed marginally stable at the
time of failure (Fig. 9).

LESSIONS LEARNT
Undrained Shear Strength

su σ v′ = 0.25 × (OCR )

0.76

( r 2 = 0 .80 ).

Trigger for External Stability
It is apparent from the data and results presented in the
previous section that the failures at KM 26 and KM 18 appears
to be due to the use of inappropriately high shear strength,
incorrect cross sectional geometry and unit weight of
embankment material in the initial stability assessments. Both
the embankments were externally marginally stable at the time
of failure.
It is evident from available instrumentation records that the
embankment at KM 26 site was undergoing rapid settlements
over approximately 2.5 months prior to failure.
The
construction rate was not controlled to allow settlement rates
to decelerate. As deformations increased the strain within the
foundation soils beyond those at which the peak undrained
shear strengths are mobilized. This eventually led to failure.
While the situation at KM 18 site also appears to be similar,
no direct evidence of accelerated settlement rate immediately
before failure is available because of the absence of
instrumentation and monitoring of initial construction
activities continuing through the early operational phase of the
MSE wall and embankment. However, available surveying
records from the site at and immediately after indicates that
the event was a progressive failure possibly triggered because
of ongoing deformations of sensitive foundation soils due to
inadequate factor of safety against external instability.

Fig. 9. Undrained stability of KM 18 embankment at failure.
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Information obtained during post failure investigations and
review earlier records from both sites before failure indicate
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that both the failures could be avoided by undertaking
adequate geotechnical investigation at the design stage and
appropriate coordination between the design office and
construction activities.

RECONSTRUCTION
Design of Remedial Measures at KM 26 Site
Reconstruction work at the KM 26 failure site included
construction of a two-stepped, 5.2-m high stabilizing berm
along the outer face of the MSE wall followed by the
reconstruction of the MSE wall and the highway embankment.
The overall berm width measured outward from the face of the
reconstructed MSE wall to the toe of the lower bench was
31.4-m.

Design of Remedial Measures at KM 18 Site
The remedial measures at the KM 18 site included installation
of PVDs to a 13-m depth, construction of a two-stepped
stabilizing berm along the outer face of the failed MSE wall,
and reconstruction of the MSE wall and the highway
embankment. For a configuration shown in Figure 11, the
minimum factor of safety against overall rotational failure for
the MSE wall, embankment and stabilizing berm at the end of
construction was estimated at 1.22. For these assessments it
was assumed that the consolidation of soils within the
PVD-treated zone would be 75 % complete at end of
construction and the effect of consolidation outside the
PVD-treated zone was neglected. Although the computed
factor of safety at end of construction is slightly smaller than
the recommendation of IRC (1979), in longer term the factor
of safety is expected to reach 1.38 upon completion of
consolidation of soils within the PVD-treated zone.

The minimum factor of safety under static loads against
overall rotational failure for the MSE wall, embankment and
stabilizing berm at the end of construction is estimated at 1.20
(Fig. 10).

Fig. 11. Undrained stability of remodeledKM 18 embankment.
Reconstruction Activity at KM 18 Site
Fig. 10. Undrained stability of remodeled KM 26
embankment.
Since berm construction was scheduled before MSE wall
reconstruction, the shear strengths for the stability assessment
were based on the assumption that the foundation soils within
the PVD treated zone extending to a distance of 4 m outward
from the MSE wall face would consolidate under the weight
of the berm by the time the MSE wall reconstruction was
complete.
As such, the factor of safety meets the
recommendation of IRC (1979).
Furthermore, as the
foundation soils underneath the berm consolidate, the factor of
safety is expected to reach a value of 1.35 after about 5 years
of berm construction.
Reconstruction Activity at KM 26 Site
The earthwork for berm construction was complete by mid
April 2005. The MSE wall and highway embankment
construction was complete by mid June 2005. The pavements
construction was complete by July 2005 and the reconstructed
highway interchange was reopened for vehicular traffic in
November 2005. Since then the earth structure appears to be
performing satisfactorily.
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PVDs (Colbonddrain® CX1000) were installed in October
2006 at 1.2 m spacing in square grid pattern using a mandrel
of diamond-shaped cross section with diagonals nominally
measuring 50 mm and 120 mm was used in PVD installation.
The PVD treatment covered an area of width of 19 m
(measured outward from the face of the failed MSE wall)
north of station 18.300 and 17 m south of station 18.300. The
stabilizing berm was constructed between October 2006 and
February 2007. The upper bench of the stabilizing berm was
20 m wide and reached an elevation 3 m below the finished
road level. The maximum overall berm width measured from
the base of the reconstructed MSE wall to the toe of the lower
bench was 37 m. Three standpipe piezometers and three
settlement gages were installed through the stabilizing berm as
discussed earlier. After the removal of the failed embankment
to an elevation approximately 5.75 m above the original
ground surface, reconstruction work for the MSE wall and the
highway embankment was taken up in February 2007. Three
standpipe piezometers and three settlement gages were
installed within the footprint of mechanically stabilized earth
wall after the removal of the failed embankment. These
installations were extended with the increasing elevation of
the top of the constructed embankment. Drilling, sampling
and Standard Penetration Testing were carried out near the end
of April 2007 to check whether the gain in undrained shear
7

strength due to accelerated consolidation of soft soils within
the PVD-treated zone was as assumed in redesign. These data
indicate that the undrained shear strengths increased by
between 25 % and 100 % following accelerated consolidation
of the soils within the PVD-treated zone and for the most part
exceeded those assumed in the overall stability assessment for
embankment redesign. As expected, the increases were most
significant within the softer zones and relatively minor within
firm to stiff layers.

appropriate coordination between the design office and
construction activities.

Embankment reconstruction above 8 m height was allowed
from May 2007 after these data were reviewed and fill
placement and paving work was completed by the beginning
of June 2007. The reconstructed highway embankment was
reopened for vehicular traffic by mid-2007. The earth
structure appears to be performing satisfactorily since the
reopening of the highway. All the monitoring instruments at
this site were in serviceable conditions throughout the
reconstruction work and the initial operational phase of the
structure. Monitoring data from these installations during the
reconstruction work and initial operational phase of the
highway have been presented earlier.

The reconstruction at KM 26 site basically involved
construction of a stabilizing berm along the outer face of the
MSE wall. The reconstruction at KM 18 site involved
installation of PVDs along the outer margins of the MSE wall
and preloading of the PVD-treated area and undertaking MSE
wall and highway embankment reconstruction following
adequate consolidation and strengthening of the soft soils
within the PVD-treated zone. Reconstruction activities at KM
26 and KM 18 sites spanned approximately six months. Both
these structures have been carrying vehicular traffic over
several months and appear to be performing satisfactorily.

Extensive geotechnical investigations were completed at both
failure sites after failure to investigate the causes of failures.
Review of these data and available pre failure information
indicate that the SHANSEP approach provides a reasonable
guidance for estimating the undrained soil strengths of the soft
foundation soils at these sites.
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CONCLUSIONS
Case histories pertaining to highway embankment failure at
two soft soil sites have been presented. Both the sites are
located within the floodplains and backswamps of river
Hooghly, a distributary of the Ganges underlain by soft silty
clay and clayey silt. One of these sites, KM 18, remains
waterlogged throughout the year, and the other, KM 26, also
remains waterlogged over prolonged periods. The MSE wall
and the associated embankment at KM 26 site was constructed
on ground improved by PVD installation followed by preload
placement, while construction at KM 18 site was undertaken
after dewatering the work site over unimproved ground.
Geotechnical investigation and analytical work undertaken
after the failures indicate that the KM 26 and KM 18 failure
was caused by the following:
•

Rapid construction rate that did not allow consolidation of
foundation soils needed for development of undrained
shear strengths assumed in the initial design, and

•

Underestimation of driving force because of the use of
smaller embankment heights and material unit weight in
the overall stability assessment of the initial design.

•

The post-failure investigations at the KM 18 site
indicated, on the other hand, that KM 18 failure was
primarily caused by
o

Overestimation of undrained shear strength, and

o

Underestimation of driving force because of the use
of smaller embankment heights and material unit
weight in the overall stability assessment of the initial
design.

Both these incidents could be avoided by undertaking
adequate geotechnical investigation at the design stage and
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